2016 | 2017 | ||||||
Price: | 33.90 | EPS | 1.82 | 1.96 | |||
Shares Out. (in M): | 118 | P/E | 18.6 | 17.3 | |||
Market Cap (in $M): | 3,983 | P/FCF | 0 | 0 | |||
Net Debt (in $M): | 1,352 | EBIT | 0 | 0 | |||
TEV (in $M): | 5,334 | TEV/EBIT | 0 | 0 | |||
Borrow Cost: | General Collateral |
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COMPANY SUMMARY
Corrections Corporation of America (“CXW”) is the largest provider of prison detention and corrections services to governmental agencies in the United States. The Company owns correctional and detention facilities and is organised as a REIT.
SUMMARY THESIS
(1) Prison population is falling (fiscal & policy reasons driving this) – prison population peaked in 2009 & has been falling since
(2) Private Prison Operators are the ‘swing capacity’ in the system – private prison operators captured a disproportionate share of the growth in inmate populations (up to 2009). As populations fall it’s easier to cancel contracts with private operators vs. closing government owned facilities (government employee redundancies, union issues, etc.)
(3) You can see this dynamic ‘in the numbers’. For CXW since 2009:
(4) Contracts are typically short duration – a very large percentage of contracts expire over the next 2-3 years. Historically renewal rates have been high (as populations grew & private populations grew disproportionately). This has changed recently. If the structural decline thesis is correct the short duration contracts are the mechanism through which it get transmitted (& potentially quickly). Also note counterparties have the right to cancel contracts unilaterally before expiry in certain circumstances (e.g. failure to secure sufficient budget appropriations);
(5) This is a largely fixed cost business – minimum staffing & other fixed costs mean the operating leverage from lost revenue (declining utilization) is significant. There is financial leverage in addition to the operating leverage
(6) There is no alternative use for the real estate – For example CXW has had facilities idle since 2008. They just sit there empty. Any ‘real estate value underpinning the downside’ thesis seems unlikely;
(7) Dividends exceed free cash flow – e.g. since REIT conversion CXW has consistently paid higher dividends than actual FCF (FFO & AFFO reported by the company are inflated). This has gotten progressively worse as operations have deteriorated
(8) CXW has given counterparties a number of options to purchase facilities at or below book value – CXW currently trades at ~2.8x P/BV. ~20% of BV is represented by facilities that either (i) automatically revert to counterparties at the end of the lease (in 2017); or (ii) where counter-parties have the option to acquire the facility at or below book value; or (iii) are currently idle;
MORE DETAIL ON EACH OF THE THESIS LIMBS
(1) Prison population is falling
(2) Private Prison Operators are the ‘swing capacity’ in the system
'Managed Only’ Facilities:
31-Dec-09 | 31-Dec-10 | 31-Dec-11 | 31-Dec-12 | 31-Dec-13 | 31-Dec-14 | 31-Dec-15 | 31-Mar-16 | |
Number of Facilities (#) | 21 | 21 | 21 | 20 | 16 | 12 | 11 | 11 |
Average available beds (#) | 25,101 | 24,285 | 26,390 | 25,324 | 21,306 | 16,763 | 15,048 | 13,898 |
Average compensated population (#) | 24,238 | 23,287 | 25,269 | 24,340 | 20,575 | 15,944 | 14,104 | 12,980 |
Average compensated occupancy (%) | 96.6% | 95.9% | 95.8% | 96.1% | 96.6% | 95.1% | 93.7% | 93.4% |
Owned & operated Facilities:
31-Dec-09 | 31-Dec-10 | 31-Dec-11 | 31-Dec-12 | 31-Dec-13 | 31-Dec-14 | 31-Dec-15 | 31-Mar-16 | |
Number of Facilities (#) | 44 | 45 | 46 | 47 | 49 | 49 | 60 | 60 |
Average available beds (#) | 61,051 | 62,518 | 63,797 | 66,538 | 67,588 | 66,179 | 65,073 | 71,296 |
Average compensated population (#) | 53,893 | 55,033 | 55,746 | 56,722 | 55,123 | 53,292 | 52,007 | 51,004 |
Average compensated occupancy (%) | 88.3% | 88.0% | 87.4% | 85.2% | 81.6% | 81.0% | 79.9% | 71.5% |
Facility | First Idled |
Beds |
Notes |
Shelby Training Center | Aug-08 | 200 | Tennessee Department of Children’s Services moved operations under its control |
Queensgate Correctional Facility* | Dec-08 | 850 | Hamilton County, Ohio terminted the lease due to funding issues |
Prairie Correctional Facility | Feb-10 | 1,600 | Minnesota and Washington had excess capacity and moved prisoners in-state |
Huerfano County Correctional Center | Mar-10 | 752 | Arizona proposed budgets to phase out the utilization of out-of-state beds (moving in-state) |
Diamondback Correctional Facility | May-10 | 2,160 | Arizona proposed budgets to phase out the utilization of out-of-state beds (moving in-state) |
Otter Creek Correctional Center | Jun-12 | 656 | Kentucky moved prisoners to an in-state facility |
MineralWells Pre-Parole Transfer Facility* | Aug-13 | 2,103 | Texas did not renew due to a legislative budget reduction |
Marion Adjustment Center | Sep-13 | 826 | Kentucky decided not to seek to renew contract |
Lee Adjustment Center | Jun-15 | 816 | Vermont decided not to seek to renew contract |
Leo Chesney Correctional Center | Sep-15 | 240 | Leased to GEO Group. Contract not renewed |
North Fork | Dec-15 | 2,400 | Out-of State facility for California. Re-let from July 2016 |
* No longer included on CXW's list of 'idled' facilities as a result of impairement that was completed in Q1'15
(4) Contracts are typically short duration
(5) This is a largely fixed cost business
(6) There is no alternative use for the real estate
(7) Dividends exceed free cash flow
12 Mths | 12 Mths | 12 Mths | 3 Mths | Total Since REIT | |
(US$ Millions) | 31-Dec-13 | 31-Dec-14 | 31-Dec-15 | 31-Mar-16 | Conversion* |
Operating Cash Flow | $369.5 | $423.6 | $399.8 | $120.3 | $1,313.2 |
Working Capital | ($42.1) | ($70.6) | ($0.1) | ($26.2) | ($139.1) |
Normalized Operating Cash Flow | $327.4 | $352.9 | $399.7 | $94.1 | $1,174.1 |
Investing Cash Flow exc. development & expansion capex | ($61.3) | ($111.1) | ($86.0) | ($4.6) | ($263.1) |
Development capex: Otay Mesa Detention Center# | ($3.1) | ($69.7) | ($87.3) | – | ($160.1) |
Normalized Free Cash Flow b/f expansion capex | $263.0 | $172.1 | $226.3 | $89.4 | $750.9 |
Acquisitions | ($36.3) | – | ($158.4) | ($1.8) | ($196.4) |
Other development & expansion capex | ($24.9) | ($16.1) | ($77.6) | ($7.8) | ($126.3) |
Normalized Free Cash Flow | $201.9 | $156.1 | ($9.6) | $79.9 | $428.2 |
Dividend Paid | ($299.4) | ($234.0) | ($250.7) | ($65.1) | ($849.3) |
Dividend Paid / Normalized FCF b/f expansion capex | 113.8% | 136.0% | 110.8% | 72.8% | 113.1% |
Dividend Paid / Normalized FCF | 148.3% | 150.0% | n/m | 81.5% | 198.3% |
# This expenditure is best thought of as maintenance capex. Ownership of the San Diego Correctional Facility reverted to the County upon expiry of the ground lease in December 2015. The Otay Mesa Detention Center is being constructed to replace the San Diego Correctional Facility and retain those prisoners (i.e. it's not an expansion). Without this expenditure the cash flows from those prisoners would have disappeared. CXW had not provisioned for this expenditure in its accounts and instead ran the expenditure through the investing cash flow line as 'expansion' capex.
12 Mths | 12 Mths | 12 Mths | 3 Mths | Total Since REIT | |
(US$ Millions) | 31-Dec-13 | 31-Dec-14 | 31-Dec-15 | 31-Mar-16 | Conversion* |
Net Income | $300.8 | $195.0 | $221.9 | $46.3 | $746.0 |
Depreciation of real estate assets | $81.3 | $85.6 | $90.2 | $23.3 | $280.4 |
Other adjustments# | ($87.4) | $30.0 | $5.3 | $1.1 | ($51.0) |
Funds From Operations (FFO) | $294.7 | $310.5 | $317.3 | $70.8 | $993.4 |
Maintenance capex | ($21.0) | ($25.5) | ($26.6) | ($3.4) | ($76.4) |
Stock based compensation | $12.9 | $14.0 | $15.4 | $3.8 | $46.1 |
Amortization of debt costs & non-cash interest | $3.5 | $3.0 | $2.9 | $0.8 | $10.2 |
Adjusted Funds From Operations (AFFO) | $290.2 | $302.1 | $309.0 | $72.0 | $973.3 |
Capex Adjusted AFFO^ | $229.9 | $242.0 | $245.4 | $52.1 | $768.5 |
Investing Cash Flow exc. development & expansion capex | ($61.3) | ($111.1) | ($86.0) | ($4.6) | ($263.1) |
Dividends Paid | ($299.4) | ($234.0) | ($250.7) | ($65.1) | ($849.3) |
Maintenance Capex / Depreciation of real estate assets | 25.8% | 29.8% | 29.5% | 14.4% | 27.3% |
Maintenance Capex / Investing Cash Flow exc. D&E capex | 34.3% | 22.9% | 30.9% | 72.2% | 29.0% |
Dividends Paid / AFFO | 103.2% | 77.5% | 81.1% | 90.4% | 87.3% |
Dividends / Adjusted AFFO | 130.3% | 96.7% | 102.1% | 125.2% | 110.5% |
# Impairment of real estate assets, extraordinary items, goodwill impairments, tax benefit from reversal of deferred tax
^ Represents AFFO + maintenance capex - depreciation of real estate assets
(8) CXW has given counterparties a number of options to purchase facilities at or below book value
[1] http://www.prisonstudies.org/highest-to-lowest/prison-population-total?field_region_taxonomy_tid=All
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